国际商务谈判过程的博弈分析

论文编号:GM228     包括:开题报告及任务书,论文字数:10797,页数:18

摘   要

     在全球化迅猛发展的今天，国际商务交流越来越频繁。伴随着国际商务的开展，国际商务谈判也已经成为世界经济活动中的重要组成部分。谈判的整个过程是双方当事人为实现各自的商业目的，使自己利益最大化的过程。在谈判中双方各自独立决策，但同时不得不考虑到对手的决策，并且要根据对手的决策调整自己的决策，其过程的本质是双方或多方当事人博弈的过程。
本文从国际商务谈判中的价格谈判部分入手，利用博弈论知识与方法分析国际商务谈判过程。首先分析国际商务谈判过程的博弈性质，接着针对国际商务谈判过程做出基本的假设并且据此对国际商务谈判的过程进行博弈模型化。然后，利用鲁宾斯坦恩轮流出价讨价还价模型思想分析利益分享为“1”和加入预期价格两种情况下的博弈解，并用效用理论得到有支付条件下的国际商务价格谈判的可能解点。最后，本文通过对国际商务谈判博弈解的分析,探讨在国际商务谈判过程中谈判双方为了争取更多利益而应该采取的有效策略建议。

【关键词】国际商务谈判 谈判过程 博弈模型 博弈解

Abstract

With the rapid development of globalization, international business communication becomes more and more frequent events. Thus, the International Business Negotiation has become a very important component in the world transaction. Negotiation is a processing of the parties involved to achieve their own commercial purposes, i.e. to ensure a maximum benefit for theirown. During the negotiation, both sides make decision separately, but they have to consider the strategies may adopt by the opponent so as to adjust their own strategies. The negotiation processing is, in essence, a game of two-parties or multi-parties.
This thesis starts from the price negotiation of international business negotiations by using the thought of Game Theory. Firstly, it analyzes the natures of the international business negotiation. Then it draws out the basic assumptions of a typical international business negotiation and according to that, constructs the Game Model of international business negotiation process. Followed by that, Game solutions are discussed in the case of fixed “1” share and added expected price by using the thought of Rubinstein Alternating Offers Model. In the case of added payment terms, Game solutions are expected by using the efficiency theory. Finally, via the game solutions discussed above, this thesis is going to recommend some strategies for the negotiators to strive for more profits.

【Key Words】International Business Negotiation; Negotiation Processing; Game Model; Game Solution

目  录

1   引言 - 2 -
2   国际商务谈判博弈的性质 .........................................- 2 -
2.1 国际商务谈判是非零和的博弈 .....................................- 3 -
2.2 国际商务谈判是动态的博弈....................................... - 3 -
2.3 国际商务谈判是不完全但完美信息的博弈 ...........................- 3 -
2.4 国际商务谈判是重复的博弈 .......................................- 3 -
3   国际商务谈判的博弈过程 .........................................- 3 -
3.1 国际商务谈判过程的假设 .........................................- 3 -
3.2 国际商务谈判过程的博弈模型..................................... - 4 -
4   国际商务谈判过程的博弈解 .......................................- 5 -
4.1 基本模型博弈解 .................................................- 5 -
4.2 一般模型博弈解 .................................................- 6 -
4.3 加入支付条件的谈判研究 .........................................- 9 -
5   策略建议与结论 .................................................- 11 -
5.1 准确估计信息因素 ...............................................- 11 -
5.2 合理把握谈判的优势势力 .........................................- 12 -
5.3 选择好后备筹码 .................................................- 13 -
5.4 死守最后期限 ...................................................- 14 -
5.5 重视延误的成本 .................................................- 15 -
5.6 合理利用其他条款把“蛋糕”做大 .................................- 15 -
参考文献 ...........................................................- 17 -
致谢词 .............................................................- 18 -